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THE EVIDENCE ACT OF 1887.
HIS act was drawn up by a gentleman who at the time
was a judge in an important judicial district of the state
of Pennsylvania, and who ever since has continued to
fill either a state or a Federal judicial position. Thus drawn up
by him, it was submitted to a large number of lawyers, more or
less prominent in different parts of the state, for suggestions
and criticism. The manner of its elaboration, therefore, would
seemingly have justified the expectation that it would be found
to be a nearly perfect piece of legislation,-an expectation, however, which, in some important respects, must be declared to
have been disappointed.
The act has certain structural defects. Its author intended
to make a sharp division between provisions in respect to civil
and provisions in respect to criminal proceedings. The 1st seetion declares that all persons shall be competent witnesses "in
any criminal proceeding." The 2nd section names exceptions (a) of one convicted of perjury; (b) of spouse as against
spouse; (c) of spouse as to confidential communications of spouse;
(d) of attorney with respect to communications of client. The
3rd section provides for the use of former testimony in criminal cases. The act in the 4th section begins to deal with evidence in civil cases. In the 5th section it repeats almost verbatim most of the above provisions concerning incompetency.
In the 9th section it allows the use of former testimony in civil
cases. At least one-fourth of so much of the act as precedes the
repealing clauses, could have been saved, had this attempt to
make separate and parallel enactments for civil and criminal
cases been omitted. Nor would clearness have been sacrificed.
1
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Had the act said, no one convicted of perjury shall be competent to testify except in cases criminal or civil, the object of
which is to permit, or prevent, or redress injury or violence,
etc., it would have been clear. Had it said, Husband and wife
shall be incompetent to testify against each other, in any civil
proceeding except one for divorce, etc., or in any criminal proceedings for desertion and maintenance, or for bodily injury,
etc., done or threatened: in prosecution of any person for
adultery with husband or wife, the wife or husband may prove
the fact of marriage; had it said, neither in criminal nor civil proceedings shall husband or wife be competent or permitted to
testify against each other, etc.; nor to testify to confidential
communications, etc., it would have been as intelligible.
Nor is the separate treatment of the two classes of cases
consistently adhered to. Section 10 abandons the policy, in
saying that "any competent witness may be compelled to testify in any proceeding civil or criminal." The combination of the
two classes would have been quite as feasible elsewhere.
The title of the act indicates that it concerns itself with the
competency of witnesses and the rules of evidence. The first
section declares that except in certain cases, "all persons shall
be fully competent witnesses in any criminal proceedings before
any tribunal." But the cases mEntioned are not exceptions to
competency. They are the preliminary hearing before a magistrate; habeas corfius to decide whether bail ought to be received;
habeas corpus to determine whether the detained person ought
to be further held, and hearings before the grand jury. In
none of these cases, says the section, "shall evidence for the
defendant be heard." But that is not because any witness is
incQmpetent, but because the evidence is irrelevant. The object of the proceeding is to find out, not whether the accused is
guilty or not, but that the evidence at the command of the Commonwealth justifies the commitment, the denial of bail, the
further detention until trial, the submission of the case in the
form of an indictment, to a petit jury. As the law, which has
nothing to do with the subject of evidence, decides that in these
inquiries only the Commonwealth's evidence may be heard, evidence for the defendant is not heard; the exclusion of it has
nothing to do with the competency of the witnesses. The accused himself, if he chose to testify against himself in the proceedings, would be heard. The reason he is not heard, when

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

3

he offers to testify for himself, is, that the object of the particular inquiry does not make the evidence relevant. In these inquiries, the tribunal does not strive to learn whether the accused is guilty, but whether the Commonwealth has weighty
enough evidence to justify the petit jury's investigation, or to
justify the refusal to enlarge the accused on bail. The socalled exceptions in section 1 to the competency of persons in
criminal cases, are not, therefore, genuine exceptions. The
author of the bill might just as well have added as an exception
to the principle, "All persons shall be fully competent witnesses," the proviso that they have testimony to offer which
shall be relevant. There are eight millions of people in the
State, but while they are competent for the most part as witnesses, not more than five or six of them would in any particular
criminal case, know anything which would be pertinent. They
could not testify, not because they are incompetent, but because
they do not know anything that bears on the issue.
The first true incompetency mentioned is that based on perjury. It is unfortunate that this exception was retained. it
was formerly thought that one who committed grave crimes, treason, felony, or crimes involving a readiness to deceive
courts and judges, were too untrustworthy to have their testimony heard or considered. The author of this act of 1887 was
willing to give up this notion as erroneous, except with regard
to one crime. But why make this exception? Does perjury
show more clearly a readiness to deceive than all other crimes?
When forgery is committed, it is intended to deceive somebody;
the person who accepts the forged document, thinking it genuine; the court and jury who may be called to pronounce upon
its genuineness. These are breaches of trust and confidence
that as clearly show disregard of the obligation to tell the truth
as does perjury. The retention of perjury as a disqualification
is arbitrary. All perjuries are not of equal turpitude. Some
imply a comparatively low degree of baseness. The perjury
that is committed to save a father or son from death is surely
not to be compared with the perjury committed by a person in
comfortable circumstances to obtain a paltry dollar or two.
The perjury precludes the convicted person from testifying
though his sentence has been complied with; though ten or
twenty or fifty years have elapsed since the conviction; though

DICKINSON LAW RUVIRW
changes in age, circumstances, education, have wrought voluminous changes in the mental and moral character.
The height of absurdity is reached when it is held that a
pardon of the crime of perjury obliterates the incompetency.1 A
pardon may be granted on many grounds. It is clear that if,
the moment before the pardon, the criminal was unfit to be believed, he is not morally any better the moment after. The
pardon would have very little significance even if it indicated
the opinion of the pardoner, that the subject had. become truthful and would not commit perjury again, but it does not flow
from any such opinion. There is no possible connection between the fitness of a man who has once committed perjury, and
been found to have committed it, to be trusted, and the fact that
he has secured a pardon, unless the pardon has been granted
because of the weakness of the evidence on which the conviction rested, or because of evidence of subsequent reformation.
The act of 1887 recognizes that serving the sentence does
not improve the character. It is equally plain that getting a
pardon from the custodians of the pardoning power, neither improves it nor furnishes the most meagre evidence that it has
been improved.
In England and some of the American States, the entire
incompetence, based on conviction of crime, has been swept
away. It ought to have been swept away by the act of 1887.
In 1843, Lord Denman's Act, often recited, "Whereas the
inquiry after cruth in courts of justice is often obstructed by incapacities created by the present laws, and it is desirable that
full information as to the facts in issue both in crimifial and in
civil cases should be laid before the persons who are appointed
to decide upon them, and that such persons should exercise their
judgment in the credit of the witnesses adduced and on the
truth of their testimony," proceeded to enact that "no person
offered as a witness shall hereafter be excluded by reason of incapacity from crime or interest from giving evidence."
The
exception of the crime of perjury is founded on a shallow psychology, but even if the perjurer were somewhat less worthy
of belief than the murderer, the thief, the forger, the obtainer
of money by false pretense, the user of false weights and measures, the tribunal ought to be presumed to have discretion
enough to appraise the value of the testimony of a witness, however discreaited by his past crimes.
"Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316.
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Not content with continuing the disqualification of the perjurer, subornation of perjury is made to have the same effect by
the awkward phrase "which term [perjury] is hereby declared
to include subornation of perjury." Why did the writer not
say simply, "A person who has been convicted

.

.

.

of

perjury, or of subornation of perjury"?
The common law treated convictions of crime in other jurisdictions as not as gravely impeaching veracity, as convictions
here, and the act of 1887 maintains the distinction. A foreign
conviction will lessen credit, but not work incompetency. The
conviction of perjury which disqualifies must have been "in a
court of this Commonwealth." Is this distinction, based on the
thought that a crime committed in New York or Maryland is not
as bad as the same crime committed in Pennsylvania? or on the
thought that we cannot feel quite as sure that a conviction in
these states will be just, as that one here will be? or in the
thought that the disqualification is a part of the punishment and
that one state will not punish crimes committed in another?
With a characteristic naivet6, the common law and the act
of 1887 allow a convict (of perjury) to testify that he or his property has been injured, for the purpose of obtaining redress from
or imposing punishment upon, the tortfeasor. He may be
heard and believed, when he accuses another of hurting himself, but not when he accuses another of hurting a third person.
Will he be less disposed to lie, in his own case, than in the case
of another? If he may be the only possible witness in his own
case, he may be the only possible witness in the case of others.
The law maker is willing because the perjured person might
possibly be without remedy in an actual case of hardship, to run
the risk of his fastening an unjust charge or liability upon
another by a fictitious accusation. He is not willing to run the
same risk in order to avoid possible injury to a third person.
Section 3 provides for the use of the former testimony of a
witness. It provides that "whenever any person has been exin any criminal proceeding conamined as a witness .
ducted in or before a court of record, and the defendant has
been present and has had an opportunity to examine or crossexamine, if such witness afterwards die, etc., notes of his examination shall be competent evidence upon a subsequent trial
of the same criminal issue, but for th&purpose of contradicting
a witness, the testimony given by him in another or in a former
proceeding may be orally proved."
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The use of former testimony in similar cases, had been allowed in Pennsylvania, before the year 1887, but it had not been
understood that that testimony must have been given in a "court
of record." It was receivable, though delivered before the
committing magistrate or justice of the peace." 2 The language
of the act of 1887 shows that either its author was forgetful of
this fact, or that he intended to change the law by restraining
the use of former testimony to such as had been delivered in a
court of record. It is singular that, despite the language of the
act, it has since been held that not only testimony given in a
court of record, e. g., at a former trial,' but that given before a
committing magistrate' may be proved. Indeed, Fell, J., remarking that the act of 1887 does not sanction the use of former
testimony which was not given in a court of record, seems to
think that such testimony, delivered before a justice, is nevertheless receivable. 5 Yet, clearly, the author of the act and the
legislature intended to define the circumstances in which former
testimony might be received, and, impliedly to forbid the use
of it in other circumstances. The act is defective in thus put.
ting an tinwise restriction on the use of such evidence, and the
courts are possibly warranted in Pro lanto nullifying it.
Whether the act wisely requires proof of the former testimony to be made by notes thereof may be a question. The act
makes no difference in this respect between criminal and civil
proceedings. It had been understood in Pennsylvania that in
civil cases at least the oral evidence of any who had heard the
former testimony, would be receivable.' It will be difficult
logically to distinguish between civil and criminal cases, upon
the language of the act of 1887, but the former practice will be
overthrown in civil cases, if only notes shall be held to be admissible evidence of the former testimony. It is regrettable
that the act leaves the law infested with this uncertainty.
Distinguishing between former testimony used as evidential of the facts averred in it, and former testimony used to
show incongruity between it and the present testimony of the
witness, the -3rd section, concerning criminal, and the 9th section concerning civil cases, add "but for the purpose of contra2

Brown v. Commonwealth, 73 Pa. 321.
Commonwealth v. Cleary, 148 Pa. 26.
4Commonwealth v. Keck, 148 Pa. 639.
5
Commonwealth v. Lenousky, 206 Pa. 277.
6P. & L. Dig. Dec. 9784.
3
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dicting a witness, the tt.stimony given by him in another, or in
a former [in the 9th section another a former] proceeding may
be orally proved." This is a pretty distinct implication that, in
the other case, the former testimony may not be orally proved.
Why was this distinction made? The aim of the law should
be to secure reliable evidence. Is then the destruction of the
force of the testimony of a witness, by evidence of prior contradictory statements of so little importance that untrustworthy evidence of those prior statements may be employed, while the testimonial use of the former testimony is of so much greater importance, that a superior kind of evidence of the contents of
such testimony must be employed? To smash the evidence of
an important witness by proof of his contradiction of himself,
may be as serious as to use the former testimony as independent
evidence. It must be remembered that, for the purpose of contradiction, declarations, whether as a witness or otherwise,
whether sworn or unsworn, whether made in court or in Pais,
are receivable, and when they were not made as a witness, they
could not well be proved by notes.
The clause (b) of Section 2 declares that husband and wife
shall not be "competent or permitted to testify against each other,
or in support of a criminal charge of adultery," committed by
or with the other. From this language might be inferred that
the consent of the spouse against whom the testimony is offered, would not justify the court in receiving it. In clause (c)
there is a prohibition of testimony by husband or wife to confidential communications, but it is qualified by the phrase "unless
the privilege be waived upon the trial." In clause (d) counsel,
it is said, shall not be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications of the client, unless "this privilege be
waived upon the trial by the client." Are we to read a similar
exception, not expressed, into clause (b)? If not, can any good
reason be urged for allowing confidential communications between wife or husband to be devulged, while absolutely forbidding other testimony against either by the other? It requires
much astuteness to detect the justification of this diversity. The
carelessness with which the act is drawn is displayed in the
omission to say, in clause (c) by whom the "privilege" is to be
waived, while in clause (d) it seems to be assumed that it is
necessary to state that the waiver must be by the "client." The
client being dead, would the waiver by the executor or administrator or by the heir be effectual?

8
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Precisely what the "privilege" is, which is to be waived, is
not clear. No "privilege" has been mentioned; only a prohibition. Doubtless the "privilege" intended is the right of the
prty to be injuriously affected by the evidence, to have it excluded, a right which is not expressed and which, therefore,
"this privilege" does not properly express.
Precisely why the last exception to the incompetence of
husband or wife to testify against the wife or husband, is made,
is hard to divine. If the husband is on trial for adultery his
wife may prove the fact of his marriage, in order to make his
conviction possible, but she may not prove the adulterous act
itself. Proving both is necessary to a conviction. Why having
allowed the wife to testify to the first, boggle at her testimony
as to the second? Proving the marriage is not, ilpsofacto, blackening his character it is true, but the proof is made in order to
blacken his character by the supplementary testimony of other
witnesses.
Section 4 begins to deal with the competency of witnesses
in civil proceedings. In any civil proceedings before any tribunal of this Commonwealth,

.

.

no liability for costs, nor

right to compensation as executor, administrator, or other trustee, nor any interest merely in the question, "nor any other interest or policy of law, except as is provided in Section 5 of this
act, shall make any person incompetent as a witness."
Exclusions of witnesses always rest on some "policy" of
the law. It was the "policy" of the law not to receive evidence
that will probably be perjured, hence, not to receive the testimony of a party in support of his cause, or of any person whose
testimony will promote his own interests. Hence, also, husband or wife was not allowed to testify for wife or husband.
Greenleaf assigns as reasons for this "the identity of their legal
rights and interests." Phillips, on Evidence, quoted by Clark,
J.,' says: "They cannot be witnesses for each other because
their interests are absolutely the same; they are not witnesses
against each other, because this is inconsistent with the relation
of marriage and the admission of such evidence would lead to
dissension and unhappiness and, possibly, to perjury." Clause
(c) of Section 5 expressly forbids a spouse's testimony against
a spouse. But there is no prohibition of a spouse's testimony
for a spouse. The foundation for such a prohibition at common
7

Bitner v. Beone, 128 Pa. 567.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
law was, as Phillips remarks, the absolute sameness of their
interests. This reason, if ever true, is true no more. The
wife's property is hers, not the husband's. His property is
his, not the wife's. The interest of sympathy, of dependence,
never was a disqualifying interest. A son or daughter could
testify for a parent, despite the competent dependence on the
parent, or the most intimate and affectionate relation between
them. The wife has dower rights in her husband's land; and
the husband the estate of courtesy in his wife's land. Each can
do what he or she chooses with the personalty, prior to death.
In so far as the interest in the dower or courtesy is concerned,
the act of 1887 makes provision to exclude wife or husband, in
the cases in which the husband or wife would be excluded,
when it excludes, besides the surviving party to a thing in action, "any other person whose interest shall be adverse" to the
right of the deceased party.
The will of the legislature expressed as clearly as possible
that no interest, no policy of law, shall exclude a witness except
as provided in section 5, "shall make any person incompetent
as a witness," has been overridden by the courts. They have
said that the policy of transferring the incompetency of one
spouse to the other, shall be a policy of law. In Bitner v.
Boone,' Clark, J., says that if the husband must be excluded on
account of interest, so also must the wife be excluded, on account of her unity of interest with him." But where is the interest? The answer is, "Although each may not be said to have
any direct interest during coverture, she has, nevertheless, an
indirect interest derivative from her husband." What is this
interest? The son or daughter will, in some circumstances, derive something from the parent. Does this disqualify? The
justice concludes a feeble argument for his decision by remarking: If the legislature had intended to change the law in this
respect, against the theory of both the common and the statute
law, and the habit of centuries, it is reasonable to suppose that
the change would not have rested upon any mere implication,
but would have been expressed in plain words." The change
has been expressed in plain words. The act of 1887 was intended to put an end to the "habits of centuries" concerning excluding evidence that might be of value. It says no interest
of liability for costs, of right to compensation as trustee, nor
8128 Pa. 567.
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any other interest or policy of law" except as is provided in section 5 of this act, shall make any person incompetent as a witness. And section 5 makes incompetent one convicted of perjury, the husband or wife, as to confidential communications, husband against wife, and vice versa; attorney as to confidential communications, and when one party to a thing in action is dead,
the surviving party or any other person whose interest is adverse. When the wife's testimony in ejectment, will promote
her dower right, she is incompetent under this clause. If she
will have no legal right over the thing sued for, by or against
the husband, she will not have an adverse interest, more than
son or daughter. Boone v. Bitner has, however, been followed
without further consideration in a good many cases, 9 and it has
therefore written an important exception into the statute.
9
Examples are Sutherland v. Ross, 140 Pa. 379; Myers v. Letts, 195
Pa. 595.

[CONCLUDED IN NEXT ISSUE]
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MOOT COURT
COMMONWEALTH v. TOLMAN.
Use of Bock Found on Prisoner as Evidence Against Him.
Marianelli for plaintiff.
McKinney for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
LONG, J.-The crime Tolman is indicted for is larceny. When the
officer arrested him he rummaged through his pockets and found a book
in which Tolman kept a diary. In this diary was the criminating evidence, the admission of which was objected to by the defendant Tolman.
The evidence was that on a day named he had visited the store of X and
had found there certain articles which he secretly took. This evidence
was admitted against the objection of the defendant and a verdict of
guilty followed. We are now asked to grant a new trial.
The question here to be decided is: Did the court err in admitting this
diary in evidence?
In the fourth and fifth amendments of the United States Constitution there is a provision that persons, papers and effects shall be secure
against unreasonable searches and seizures, and that no person shall be
compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself. The Pennsylvania Constitution also provides that no person on trial for a criminal
offense shall be compelled to give evidence against himself.
The leading case on this question is Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616.
This case held that the seizure or compulsory production of a man's"private papers, to be used as evidence against him in a prosecution for a
crime, penalty, or forfeiture is prohibited by the United States Constitution.
It appears very plainly that both the seizure and the admission in
evidence of the defendant's private diary are prohibited by both the Federal and the State Constitution.
There is an exception to the rule in some states in cases where the
evidence objected to as incriminating evidence is to produce identification.
In People v. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, there is an example of this exception where a defendant in a criminal trial was required to stand up in
court to be identified, this was held not to be a violation of the rule that
no person shall be required to give evidence against himself in a criminal
case., But see Cooper v. State, 86 Ala. 610.
Of such a nature is the only Pennsylvania case relied upon by the
counsel for the Commonwealth. The case is Commonwealth v. Roddy,
184 Pa. 274. The defendants in this case, after their arrest were brought
to the place where the robbery was alleged to have been committed, and
there, in the presence of and at the request of the person robbed, masks
were put on the faces of the defendants against their wills for the purpose of identification. The evidence in this case was admissible. In the
case at bar there is no question of identification.
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There is another exception to the rule. If one on trial for a crime
has made a voluntary confession or admission of the crime and this is
shown the defendant can no longer claim the privilege as to incriminating
himself.
The main contention ii that the written admission in the diary of
the defendant is a voluntary admission and that by making such voluntary admission the defendant has lost his right to the privilege.
But are these admissions in the diary of the defendant voluntary admissions within the meaning of the term? The mere writing of admissions in a diary and the writer holding them only for his own private satisfaction, and not voluntarily disclosing them to any other person, is not
such a voluntary admission as would estop the defendant from claiming
his privilege.
Confessing a thing to oneself is not the sort of voluntary confession
the law interprets as a voluntary confession. In order that a confession
be such a voluntary confession it must be made voluntarily to another.
Judgment reversed and a new trial granted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
To the immunity of an accused person from furnishing evidence
against himself, there are some exceptions. The defendant will not be
allowed to absent himself from his trial, in order to prevent identification
of himself by witnesses. Being present he would not be permitted to mask
his face. Witnesses may be directed to look at him, and say whether he
is or is not, the man whom they saw perpetrate the crime, or whom they
present at a place, presence at which conduces to show guilt of the crime.
Cf. 3 Wigmore p. 3123.
The courts of Pennsylvania are not always squeamish about compelling a prisoner to perform acts which will assist in identifying them as
guilty. On a trial for murder, the prisoner was asked to pronounce certain
phrases which the perpetrator of the crime had uttered when committing
it, in order to facilitate the witness' identification of him. This, says
Sterrett, J., is not compelling him "to give evidence against himself."
"The sole object of the request was to afford the witness, Mrs. Sharpless, then on the stand, an opportunity of seeing the prisoner and hearing
the sound of his voice" etc. To say that this was a violation of the bill
of rights, says the justice, "would in my judgment be a strained construction of that instrument." Johnson v. Commonwealth, 115 Pa. 369.
At other times the courts are more punctilious in favor of the accused. They will not, whether at the trial for the offense (Boyle v.
Smithman, 146 Pa., 255; Logan v. R. R. Co., 143 Pa. 403;) or in some
preliminary proceeding (Horstman v. Kaufman, 97 Pa. 147), compel the
defendant to testify to facts, or to produce books, which may be used,
either at the same investigation, or in a later one to incriminate him.
Had prisoner or his counsel been compelled by the trial court to produce
the book for use against the former, it would doubtless have been error.
Com. v. Meads, 11 Dist. 10.
It might have been supposed, a priori, that if the courts would refuse to compel a person to produce a documentif it tendedto incriminate
him, especially if he were the defendant on trial for the crime which the
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document would be used to prove, they would notsanction the use of such
documents, if taken forcibly from the accused by the administrative
agents of the law. There is not much difference between the court's directly exerting the pressure on the accused to produce the incriminating
article, and accepting from policeman or constable, the fruits of a pressure exerted by them. Yet, it is a commonplace of the law, that if officers
take the tools of a burglar, or a highwayman, a pistol, or a knife
adapted to wound or kill from an accused person, the fact that he was
in possession of them and they themselves, may be exhibited in evidence
against him. Indeed Sterrett, J., argues in Johnson v. Commonwealth,
supra,to the propriety of asking Johnson to speak in court in order that
a witness might identify his lisping, from the right to search for stolen
property on the person or premises of the suspected, and to use the discovery of it as evidence of guilt. Wigmore points out that an illegality
even, in the mode of obtaining evidence, has not been held to exclude it,
except in the case of Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, and a few.
cases following it. Judicial opinion he says "has generally refused to
accept its pronouncement." 3 Wigmore 3127. In that case the immediate question before the court was the legality of an order of the court,
requiring the defendant to produce a paper, on pain of having his guilt
assumed. Whatever else was in it was dictum.
Had the officer rummaged through the pockets of the defendant and
found a knife, pistol, etc., or lettets addressed to him showing that he
was in a plot to steal, the articles thus found could have been used
against him. Even papers written by himself, if not testimonial in
character, could have been used against him. The letters obtained contained testimonial statements, that'is, assertion of facts. We can see
no substantial difference between the two sets of papers. The criminal
significance of a non-testimonial paper may be as clear and impressive
as that of a testimonial paper. What reason is there for saying that a
paper of the former class though forcibly taken from the prisoner, can
be employed, if one of the latter cannot be?
The learned court below suggests that evidence for identification of
the prisoner is distinguishable from other evidence and that for that
purpose, evidence compelled from the prisoner may be properly employed.
But, to identify the prisoner with the criminal is as important as to prove
any element of the crime. If a man can be compelled to furnish proof
of his being the person who is shown by other evidence to have committed a crime, he could scarcely complain of being also obliged to furnish evidence of the criminal fact.
- In Commonwealth v. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, the prisoners were obliged,
virtually, by the officer, to put on masks, in a certain way, in order that
the victim might, in his dying declaration, identify them. Probably, the
court itself would have done so, at the trial. Williams, J., was willing
to concede that the use of the mask was under the circumstances "questionable. "
In Commonwealth v. Fisher, 221 Pa. 538, letters written by a prisoner, awaiting trial for murder, to his wife, containing admissions were,
in some way, "obtained by the district attorney and put in evidence. The
only objection that the supreme court seemed to feel, was, that they had
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been obtained from the wife, with her consent, and that she was virtually testifying to confidential communications of her husband and testifying against him.
The letters, considered as confessions, were not objectionable. They
were not written under the influence of hope or fear improperly engendered. That a confession is obtained by trick, by the basest treachery,
indeed, is no obstacle to its use, for when the state is pursuing criminals,
it does not indulge in sentimental finesse. Waging war on those whom
it regards as its enemies, it deems it entirely honorable touse the basest
service of the basest men. It will not disdain to convict a man even of a
capital offence, by the testimony of men who have attained their information, by the grossest falsehood and imposture, and who in communicating it have been guilty of the meanest treachery.
Unable to draw a clear line between many compulsions of a prisoner
to furnish evidence against himself, which are habitually perpetrated and
the particular compulsion in question, we must conclude that if any legal
wrong,was done to the accused, in taking his letters from his pocket, it
did not make illegitimate the use of them as portions of the evidence
against him.

TILGHMAN v. INSURANCE CO.
FACTS.
The policy on which the action is brought stipulated that it was to
become void should there be any "increase of risk within the control or
knowledge of the insured." The plaintiff conspired with another to set
fire to the building, but, before their intention could be carried out the
building was accidentally burned.
McCall for plaintiff.
Routh for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
STUGART, J.-The case at hand resolves itself into two questions:
1st.-Is a conspiracy an act?
2nd.-Does a conspiracy to burn a house increase the risk of the insured?
In answering the first question we must say that a conspiracy is the
agreeing of two or more persons to carry out some criminal or fraudulent
act, to injure or defraud some person or persons, and cannot be called an
act; it is merely an intent until they proceed with the intention of carrying it out. The insurance company in this policy says, "any act done to
increase the risk," therefore we construe the word "act" to mean an
"overt act" something realized by motion. No cases can be cited that
construe the word "act" other than an overt act, and a conspiracy is
not an overt act.
9 Cyc. 590. 27 Pa. 339. 2 Watts 23.
It is a well settled rule of construction that words will be construed
most strongly against the person or party that used them. And in this
case the Insurance Company used the words, therefore the plaintiff
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should have the benefit of the doubt. In answering the second question
if there was a conspiracy to burn the house there was no act done to accomplish that end. Clark on contracts, p. 233 says: "It is essential in
order to sustain an action of deceit or to give a party the right to avoid
a contract on the ground of fraud that he shall have been injured or prejudiced by the fraud."
8 Cyc. 651, and 111 Pa. 335, hold that a conspiracy to injure one in his
trade or business by fraud or misrepresentation is actionable only where
it results in injury.
5 W. N. C. 537. A contract in writing will as between two interpretations be given that which seems to be nearest the literal meaning of
the terms.
Therefore as a conspiracy is an unfulfilled intent to do something and
as there was no act to do that something we think that there was no risk.
Just because Tilgman and his servant talked about burning down the
house to collect the insurance it cannot be said that the risk was made
greater. This universe is kept up not by that which people say they are
going to do but what they do.
The court is of the opinion that the defendant cannot nullify the
policy and that thfi plaintiff is entitled to judgment.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The policy was to become void, if there should be an "increase of
risk by any means within the control or knowledge of the insured."
A risk is the conduciveness of the situation in which the property is
to the burning of it. If oil is stored in it, one of the conditions for a destructive fire is furnished. So, if fire is carelessly manipulated on the
premises; if a business is conducted upon it, which frequently engenders
conflagration.
The exposedness of the premises to invasion by men who seeing it
unwatched and unoccupied, may be tempted to set fire to it, is apparently not a risk, so that the vacation of the house is not an increase of risk;
19 Cyc. 726. [But Trunkey observes in Ins. Co. v. Usaw, 112 Pa. 80,
"Perhaps the risk was increased when the house became tenantless."]
A vacant house does not take fire more readily than an occupied one, but
the probability of successful efforts to burn it is increased.
In a sense when a man has formed the design to burn a house, and
is in a position to execute it the danger of fire is increased. Purposed
fires do not occur till the purpose is formed and a considerable percentage of purposes go into deed. Remembering the principle, mentioned
by the learned court below, that "this policy is to be interpreted most
strongly against the company whose contract it is," Tool Co. v. Assurance Co., 132 Pa. 236, we adopt the view taken in the trial court, and
also in Ampersand Hotel Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 198 N. Y. 495. Gray, J.,
there said, "Here though the conspiracy, as we must assume, was entered into, it was to execute a plan of defrauding the insurer. The conspiracy did not come to a head. The property and the contract to insure it
were unchanged and unaffected by what was a mere proposal to affect
them. The purpose to burn up the property never had ceased to be a
purpose within the domain of thought. * * * As the trial judge well
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suggested, the conspiracy remained but a mental conception. It was
not the cause of the fire and it had no connection with it."
It is not necessary, going thus far with Gray J., that we should accept his further logic: "The defendant could not sue for damages by
reason of the conspiracy, and if that be true, I think it could not set it
up as a defence to the performance of the contract."
Affirmed.

DREMAN'S EXR'S v. JNO. MULFORD.
Liability of Surety.

Statute of Limitations.
bursement.

Right to Reim-

FACTS.
John Mulford wishing to borrow $500 went to his friend Thos. Drennan and induced him to endorse a promissory note of which he Mulford
was maker as accomodation endorser. Mulford then went to Adrian
Maxwell and obtained the money on the note.
No payment of interest or principal was made upon this note for
more than six years after the date of maturity nor was any liability ever
admitted in regard to payment of it by Mulford or Drennan.
Five years and eleven months after the endorsing of the note Drennan died. The laws of the state suspend the running of the time within
which an action must be brought for 18 months after the death of the
person against whom an action exists and 3 months after the death of
Drennan, Maxwell brought suit against Drennan's estate and recovered
judgment for principal and interest.
Drennan's executors bring action against Mulford for reimbursement
and Mulford sets up as a defence that at the time of the bringing of the
action against Drennan's estate, which was 6 years and 2 months after
the cause of action had accrued, no action could be maintained against
him and that he therefore is not liable. Note for 5 days. Time of
bringing action is limited to six years by statute.
McCall for plaintiff.
O'Hara for defendant.
ROGERS, J.-In the case before us the relation of the plaintiff's decedent to Maxwell and Mulford, was the same as in Shamburg vs. Abbot,
112 Pa. 6, which holds: "Whenever one person is legally bound to pay a
proper debt of another, the former, in a certain sense occupies the position of surety for the latter, and if surety pays he has a right of action
against the principal." The defendant's argument inthe case is that the
statute of limitations began to run when the note was made and the
plaintiff contends that the surety's right of action does not accrue until
he has paid the debt of his principal and therefore that he has six years
after he pays the note.
Against a claim upon a principal debtor, by surety who has paid the
debt, the statute of limitations runs, not from the time when the debt
was due, but from the time when the surety paid it.
Thayer vs. Daniels, 110 Mass. §45.
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Trickett on Law of Limitations in Pennsylvania.
The plaintiff's right of action is based on a contract implied by law
and if the debt he pays is protected by any collateral of his principal, he
is assigned the collateral as he is substituted in the place of the creditor
or payee. This is to give the surety who pays, all remedies that the
creditor has against the principal.
Fairies vs. Cockrill, 28 L. R. A. 528.
The right to substitution is founded upon a mere principle of equity
and benevolence, and not necessarily upon either priority or contract between parties. 6 Watts 221; 72 Pa. 102.
The next question to be considered is, if the debt of the debtor is
paid by the surety which thereby extinguishes the old debt, what does
the payer sue on?
In Faries vs. Cockrill, 28 L. R. A. 528, it was held that he must sue
on an implied promise. In Shamburg vs. Abbott, 112 Pa. 6, it was held,
"That the right of action may sometimes be asserted by an independent
suit and at other times in the form of subrogation."
It is held in 7 Cush. 253, where a note was paid by a surety, the
debt became extinguished and that the only way the surety could
bring action was to claim the amount of the maker, for the money paid
by request and for his use.
In the present case the surety in an obligation has been required to
pay it and the payee's rights against the principal debtor have been
barred by limitation. But it is held in Faries vs. Cockrill, 28 L. R. A.
528; 20 Ohio 337, and Willis vs. Channing, 90 Tex. 617: that this does
not preclude the sureties from recovering against the debtor as their
right rests on the implied contract between the principal and surety.
Therefore as there is no bar to an action for recovery by plaintiff, he
should be allowed to recover.
Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
The note was payable in five days. More than six years had run
since its maturity, when the action was brought against Drennan but, he
having died, and therefore the statute of limitations being suspended for
18 months, this action was in time against him. An action begun simultaneously against Mulford, by the creditor Maxwell, would have been
too late. Drennan's executor having suffered a judgment against him,
which he has since paid, is not precluded from seeing Mulford at any
time within six years from such payment, and though the suit will be
begun more than six years since the creditor could have sued him. The
statute of limitations runs against the surety's action against the principal only from the time at which he made the payment not from the time
when the principal became suable by the creditor. 11 P. & L. Dig. Dec.
18786; Levering v. Rittenhouse, 4 Wh. 130; Taylor v. Gould, 57 Pa. 152;
Wheatfield Township v. Brush Valley Township, 25 Pa. 112; Child's
Suretyship, 313; 25 Cyc. 1113; Trickett, Limitations, 268, 271; Martin v.
Frantz, 127 Pa. 389.
The question presented in this case arises from the fact that when
the action was brought against the surety, the plaintiff, the statute of
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limitations had barred an action by the creditor against the defendant.
If the creditor could not then have compelled the defendant to pay, had
the surety a right to pay, and thus subject the defendant to an obligation from which, so far as the original creditor was concerned, he was
exempt?
We do not think that if the discharge of the defendant from the
necessity of paying the creditor, discharged the surety also, he could
nevertheless choose to pay, and pay, and thus recreate an obligation upon
the principal. Had both been discharged by the lapse of time, the law
would not allow the surety being honest to pay the debt and'then compel
the principal to be honest likewise. Wheatfield Township v. Brush Valley Township, 25 Pa. 112. A voluntary'payment by the surety, though
prompted by the highest ethical considerations, can give origin to no
right against the principal. If then, the surety could have successfully
defended the suitby Maxwell against him, he cannot recover in this action.
Could he have thus defended?
The only ground of defence would have been that the statute of
limitations made the success of a suit by the creditor against the principal impossible. This would probably not have been a successful defence.
Certain statutes prescribe a time in which claims must be presented
against'a dead man's estate. Unless so presented they are barred. Yet,
it has been held that this bar, so far as the estate of a dead principal is
concerned, is no obstacle to a suit against the living surety, and hence is
no obstacle to a recovery of the surety against the principal's estate.
Sibley v. McAllister, 8 N. H. 389; Hooks v. Branch Bank, 8 Ala. 580;
Childs' Suretyship, 309. The surety may be liable, because his absence
from the state has arrested the running of the statute of limitations,
while the statute has barred the creditor's action against the principal.
The surety, upon paying, may recover indemnity from the principal.
Childs' Suretyship, 309; Cf. Peaslee v. Breed, 10 N. H. 489; Martin v.
Frantz, 127 Pa. 389. It follows that the decision of the learned court below is correct, and its judgment must be affirmed.

GIBSON v. GIBSON.
Testamentary Exclusion of Heirs-Restraint on AlienationBill for Specific Performance.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
The testator, Gibson, bequeathed all his personal estate to his wife,
and then provided, inter alia, as follows: "Also to my children, Mary and
Jane, all my real estate lying in the counties of Cumberland and York,
share and share alike. My sons shall have no share therein, they already
having received their full share of my estate. Mary and Jane shall have
no power to sell any of the land herein devised to them." John and
William, the two sons of the testator, have contracted, to convey a half
interest in a farm in Perry County, of which the testator was owner at
the time of his death, to Mary and Jane, in return for their conveyance
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to the sons of a Cumberland County farm, received by them under the
above will. The widow has agreed to join in both conveyances. The
sons seek specific performance.
Puderbaugh for plaintiff.
Stevenson for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
MARSHALL, J.-Upon the facts in this case we think it quite fair
as suggested by the plaintiff to assume that the land belonging to John
and William Gibson which they are attempting to convey descended to
them either (1) under another portion of the will or (2) by the intestate
laws of the state. It is highly probable that the testator in his will did
not provide for the disposition of the land in Perry County. See Act 1833,
P. & L. Dig. Col. 2708. We therefore hold in any case the plaintiff has
such land and title thereto which could be conveyed.
As to the provision in the will against alienation of the estate devised
to the daughters, Mary and Jane, we hold such provision to be absolutely
void. We think from the wording of the will and the intention of the
testator that a fee simple was devised to the daughter. And it has been
held that right of alienation is an inherent and inseparable quality of the
estate in fee simple and a condition against all alienation in a grant or
devise of such estate or a provision forbidding all alienation is void as
repugnant to the estate granted or devised. 64 Pa. Yard's Appl; 53
Pa. 311, Kipper's Appl; 48 Pa. 211, McClenken's Appl.
The defendant's contention that only a life estate was given is without foundation as we think the construction of the will clearly shows the
devising of a fee and not a life estate. True it that is a partial restraint
may be had or put upon the land even "during life of any person" as held
in Kaufman v. Burgett, 195 Pa. 274, but upon all the evidence and apparent intention of the testator we hold that a fee was devised to the daughters and the provision against alienation is void.
We are now to consider what we deem the only vital point in the case,
whether or not this agreement was in writing and properly signed. 11
A. & E. Cy. of Law 561, it is said: "A contract for the exchange of lands
is as much within the statute of frauds as a contract for the sale of
land." For a sale of land the contract must be in writing and signed by
the vendor. Everhart v. Dolph, 133 Pa. 628. Now considering an exchange of land where land is the subject matter and consideration of
both conveyances we think the contract should be in writing and signed
by both parties on the ground of mutuality of remedies. There is no case
in Pennsylvania exactly on this point but we think if such a case should
arise it would be decided on the equitable principle stated.
If this contract were in writing and signed as stated we feel that the
decree must be given for the plaintiff, but if on the other hand it lacks
the essential principles the decree must be refused.
We will say though, to show the law of Pennsylvania on the subject of
parol contracts for the exchange of land that if the parol agreement is established by clear, precise and indubitable evidence and consummated by
actual possession it is not within the Statute of Frauds. Mass. v. Culver,
54 Pa. 414; 195 Pa. 245, Germyn v. McClure; 38 Pa. 60, Taylor v. Hen-
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derson. But nothing was done in the case at bar to indicate a part performance.
We are not inclined to treat the contract as a written one according
to the facts given, especially so when as here it would have to appear to be
signed by both parties. It must be treated as a parol agreement.
On this ground only do we refuse specific performance to the
plaintiff.
Verdict in favor of defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT.
If, as the learned court below assumes, the contract to reciprocally
convey the pieces of land was oral, compulsory performance of it would
be to nullify the statute of frhuds. No circumstances are disclosed,
which exempt a contract from the operation of that statute. It applies
to contracts for the exchange of lands, as well as to contracts for the
conveyance of land for some other consideration than land; 20 Cyc. 225.
Were the obstacle consisting of the parol nature of the contract
overcome, there would be no difficulty in the way of compelling performance. The sons are the plaintiffs. They are aware of the restrictions in
the testator's will, upon the daughters' power to aliene. If they choose
to accept an imperfect title, the imperfection of it is not a sufficient
reason for denying to them what they desire. The court's decree, followed by obedience to it, will not nullify the will of the testator, if, otherwise, that will can be carried out.
The learned court below has, however, correctly concluded that the
restriction is void. The "bequest" to the daughters Mary and Jane of
"all my real estate lying in the counties of Cumberland and York, share
and share alike," was a devise of a fee.
The restraint is expressed thus: "Mary and Jane shall have no power
to sell any of the land herein devised to them." It lasts, then, not for a
few years; not until the happening of a certain event, whose nature
would make reasonable the power to alienate upon its occurrence; but
during the lives of the daughters. It is therefore wholly void. 11
Forum, 75.
Appeal dismissed.

BOOK REVIEWS.
Law for the Ametican Farmer, by JoHN B. GREEN, of the
New York Bar. The Macmillan Company, 66 Fifth Avenue,

New York; 1911.
We took up this book with a certain prepossession unfavorable to it. An examination of it however, has surprised us with
the amount of legal information, tersely and lucidly told, on all
the subjects that can interest the farmer as such. The mode of
acquiring a farm, the title to the farm, adverse possession of
the farm, its boundaries, its appurtenances and easements which
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affect it, farm workers, waters on the farm, irrigation, laws concerning pure milk and pure food, crops and other farm produce,
live stock, contracts of various sorts, sales, warranty, factors,
common carriers, insurance, are some of the topics dealt with.
Each legal principle is supported by an authority in the notes.
The book, the price of which $1.50 gives an immense amount
of information of which even the attorney might not be unwilling to avail himself in an emergency. The book is superior, we
think, to any of its class that has ever passed under our notice.
It is bound in cloth, and is published as one of a series, known
as the Rural License Series, by the well known publishers, the
Macmillan Company.
Handbook of the Law of Partnerships, including Limited

Partnerships, by

EUGENE

ALLEN GILMORE.

West Publishing

Company; St. Paul, Minn., 1911.

The Hornbook Series, published by the West Publishing
Co. had already embraced a work on partnership by William
George. The present book although originally designed to be
anew edition of George's, is really an independent work. Of
George's text. it substantially retains but two chapters out of
eleven. The learning and experience of Prof. Gilmore, of the
law school of the University of Wisconsin are a guaranty that
this treatise is well adapted to the needs no less of students than
of practitioners. The type is good and the citations are numerous. The substance of the work is well distributed although
some of the titles of chapters seem to be merely alternate forms
of the same thing. When we learn "what constitutes a partnership" (chap. 1) we are apt to learn also about the "formation
and classification" (chap. 2) and the "nature and characteristics" (chap. 3) of a partnership. In chapter 5 we have an
excellent presentation of the powers of partners. Equally satisfactory are the chapters on the partnership liability, the relations of partners inter se, and the remedies of creditors. The
possible actions between partners and between partners and extraneous parties, are well explained in chapters 8 and 9. There
is an important discussion of limited partnerships in the final
chapter. We note on page 200 a statement of the doctrine of
Doner v. Stauffer, for whose inaccuracy, if there be inaccuracy,
the writer of the opinion, rather than Prof. Gilmore, is responsible. The opinion is indeed one of the most elusive and
inconsequent discussions to be found in our reports. The book
is well worthy of a place in the Hornbook series.

A Concise Law Dictionary, by FREDERIC JESUP STIMSON,
revised by HARvEY CORTLANDT VOORHEES, 1911; Little, Brown
& Co., Boston.
This is, as it professes to be, a concise dictionary of 346
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pages, in the size and shape of the Students' Series. Nearly
2000 important words have been added to the original work, and
the correctnes of the claim made for the new addition, that "no
other Law dictionary contains so many definitions and translatons
of French and Norman-French 'law terms" may be assumed.
Under the word court appears an admirable discussion, in 14
pages, of the various English and American courts. Very useful is the list of abbreviations, under that word, covering over
50 pages. Of much utility to the law student, is a table of
British Regnal Years, found at the end of the book. The very
reasonable price, $3.00, makes the purchase of the book possible
to many who would hesitate to spend twice or four times that
sum, on a bullkier book. The type is very clear and the paper
excellent, features indeed of all the publications of Little, Brown
& Co. The size and shape of the book render it very convenient
to handle. References to it can be made much more quickly
than to larger volumes. We can cordially commend Stimson's
Law Dictionary not merely to lawyers but especially to students
of law.
Commentaries on the Law of Municipa. Corporations, by
JOHtN F. DILLON, LL. D. Fifth Edition. 1911. Little, Brown
& Co., Boston.
It is 39 years since the first edition. of this work appeared,
and during all that time, it has maintained a unique place in the
estimation of the profession. Its author, once a circuit Judge
of the United States, later Chief Justice of the State of Iowa,
still later, a leading practitioner of the American Bar, and a
professor of law in' Columbia University, is well known to every
lawyer, as a jurist of comprehensive learning and much literary
power. The fourth edition was embraced in two volumes. The
text of this, Ithe fifth, covers in four volumes 3064 pages. A
fifth volume of 738 pages is wholly taken up with a table of over
40,000 cases, (494 pages) and an index. The matter in the
new edition is two and one half times as much as that of its immediate predecessor. New chapters have been added on Municipal Trading, Municipal Ownership of Public Utilities, Grants
of Franchise to Corporations and Individuals, Obligations of the
grantees of such franchise; Purchase of works of Company by
the Municipality; Rights of Municipality and grantee at the expiration of the franchise, Duties to Consumers, Regulation of
rates. All of these topics have grown to be of vast importance
in the last decade. The discussions of Limitations of Indebtedness, of constitutional prohibition of special legislation concerningcorporations, of the ordinance-power, of municipal bonds.
and other contracts, are voluminous and thorough. We have
been deeply interested by the treatment of the eminent domain,
the applicability of the statute of limitations to municipalities,
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their liability for mobs, riots, the torts of their officers. Procedural subjects have not been neglected. There are important chapters on Mandamus, Quo Warranto, Remedies in Equity.
Chapter XIV of 150 pages, is an extraordinarily able discussion
of the subject of special assessments on property holders, for
local improvements of various sorts. Taxation is treated in a
chapter of 180 pages. The amount of work expended on this
new edition may be in part realized,, when we think that it contains 2200 pages more than the 4th edition, and that it cites
20,000 additional cases.
During the 39 years of its existence, Dillon on Municipal
Corporations has, as Justice Bradley remarked, "come to be indispensable both to the lawyer and to the judge." It is said
that of 472 decided cases on municipal corporations taken at
random from the Reports, the earlier edition was cited in 400
cases.
The typographical execution of the book is admirable.
The binding is one of the most handsome that we have seen.
The publication of this great work, so soon after that of Wigmore's colossal and unrivalled book on Evidence, displays an
enterprise on the part of the long famous Boston publishers, an
appreciation of the higher needs of the profession of the law,
that are worthy of all admiration and deserve the plaudits of the
bar.
The Construction and Interpretation of the Laws, by HENRY
CAMPBELL BLACK, M. A.

2d edition.

West Publishing Com-

pany, St. Paul, Minn., 1911.
A somewhat careful examination of the second edition of
Mr. Black's work on the interpretation of laws, has convinced
us not simply of its decided superiority to the first edition, but
of its great worth as an authority upon its important theme.
In the 624 pages, which compose the book we have been particularly struck with those which are devoted to the Construction of Constitutions, the general principles of statutory construction, the literal and grammatical construction, extrinsic
aids to construction, retrospective interpretation, mandatory and
directory statutes and amendatory and amended acts. The
author insists on the principle not always remembered, unfortunately, that "it is not permissible, under the pretence of interpretation, to make a law different from what the law-making
body intended to enact." His remarks on "equitable constructton" are very judicious. The section on clerical errors and
misprints contains a collection of cases in which the courts have
variously corrected the language of statutes; e. g. by making
county read "city," by striking out the word "not", by substituting or for "on" and on for 'or', by substituting the
word "utters" for "alters," even in the definition of a crime in
a criminal statute, etc. Under the subject of extrinsic aids to
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interpretation, a remarkably good chapter, it is interesting to a
Pennsylvania lawyer to find noted the fact that Chief justice
Gibson, in considering whether a certain act. repealed another,
referred to his having been a member of the legislature which
passed the later act, wherefore he said "I know that no repeal
was in fact contemplated." There is a noteworthy precision in
the statements of the principles which are necessarily conceived
with a certain vagueness. There are few which it would be
necessary to criticize. A proposition on page 620 that federal
courts will adopt the settled construction by state courts of state
statutes, "without inquiry as to its soundness, unless some question of federal law is involved" might seem to imply that, in that
case, the federal courts would reject the "settled construction" of
the state courts; an implication which, we think, is not warranted by the attitude of the federal courts.
We cordially commend this book to the practitioner, not
less than to the student of law.
Law Office and Court Proceedure, GLEASON L. ARCHER,

LL. B., 1910; Little, Brown & Co., Boston.
On a former occasion we called attention to this very interesting and suggestive book, The first part deals with the
action of the attorney before drawing the writ; the second with
matters occurring after the issue of the writ but before trial;
the third with the trial, and the fourth with proceedings after
verdict. These parts are full of wise counsel, tersely and vividly
given with illustrations which make it concrete and realistic to
a high degree. The first chapter, on The Client and his Story,
begins with a caution against giving hasty advice, and strikingly inculcates the lesson, which inexperienced practitioners
often much need to learn, that they should "rarely if ever,
venture to decide a question of any importance, without first
consulting authorities." Among the more important chapters
are those which treat of the direct examination of witnesses and
of cross-examination. These are followed by several "illustrative examinations," covering 50 pages, the careful study of
which will well repay the reader. The perusal of the text of
this book, containing somewhat more than 300 pages, will reward even the most experienced practitioners. To the beginner, a careful consideration of all the sage suggestions with
which the book abounds, must be of very great value. We
know no other book with the same general aim, that approaches
this in interest, and practical utility.

